The Irvin Law Firm is a multifaceted practice in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. With over 40 years of experience handling the same practice areas, we are familiar with the problems facing our clients and the solutions that are available.
Areas of Practice:
Administrative
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Bad Faith Insurance
Business & Commercial
Business Organizations
Car Accident
Civil Rights
Constitutional
Construction
Contracts
Criminal Defense
DUI / DWI
Foreclosure & Alternatives
Immigration
Insurance
Litigation & Appeals
Personal Injury
Premises Liability
Real Estate
Traffic Ticket
White Collar Crimes
Workers' Compensation
Wrongful Death
Credentials:
Education:
University of South Carolina School of Law
Major: Law JD-Juris Doctor, Graduated 1967
University of Georgia
Bachelor of the Arts, Graduate 1963
University of North Carolina
Associations:
President- Phi Delta Phi 1966-1967
Member-Federal Bar Association
Member-National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
Member-South Carolina Bar Association
Cases:
I Have Gone to The Supreme Court to Protect My Clients Domestic Law Rights and Won.
Practice Area:Divorce / Separation
Description:McGREW v. McGREW 273 S.C. 556 (1979) 257 S.E.2d 743 Barbara F. McGREW, Respondent, v. Richard S. McGREW, Sr., Richard S. "Chip" McGrew, Jr., Patrick Neil McGrew, and Barbara Ann McGrew, Defendants, of whom Richard S. McGrew, Sr. is Appellant. 21037 Supreme Court of South Carolina. August 21, 1979. Thomas F. McDow, Rock Hill, for appellant. Emil W. Wald, Rock Hill, for defendants. James T. Irvin, Jr., Rock Hill, for respondent. Pg: 558 "The Family Court was, however, without jurisdiction to determine the arrearage due under the separation agreement, since such liability was based solely upon the contract between the parties. Zwerling v. Zwerling, S.C. 255 S.E.2d 850 (1979). Therefore, so much of the order under appeal as directs the husband to pay the sum of $1,904.53 is reversed. The wife is free, of course, to pursue her contract remedies to recover for the husband's alleged breach of the separation agreement, and any other remedies available to require the husband to comply with his duty and obligation to support his children. The judgment is accordingly affirmed in part and reversed in part. LITTLEJOHN, NESS, RHODES and GREGORY, JJ., concur."
Practice Area:Criminal Defense
Outcome:Reversed in part
Description:STATE v. BELLUE 259 S.C. 487 (1972) 193 S.E.2d 121 The STATE, Respondent, v. Andrew BELLUE, Appellant. 19520 Supreme Court of South Carolina. November 20, 1972. Messrs. W.M. Brice, Jr., of York, James T. Irvin, Jr., and Robert M. Jones, of Rock Hill, for Appellant. Messrs. Daniel R. McLeod, Atty. Gen., Emmet H. Clair, and Robert M. Ariail, Asst. Attys. Gen., of Columbia, and William R. Hare, Sol., of Chester, for Respondent. Pgs: 495, 496: "We find all exceptions challenging the jury finding of guilty without merit. We now consider whether the sentence to death by electrocution can stand in the light of Furman v. Georgia, supra. In that case, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the imposition of the death penalty was unconstitutional as applied in Georgia. The method of applying the death penalty in Georgia is similar to that in South Carolina. The judgment in [ 259 S.C. 496 ] the Furman case was reversed only insofar as the death penalty was concerned and the case was remanded for further proceedings. The Furman case permits us to affirm the judgment of conviction of the defendant of murder and to reverse only the imposition of the death penalty, leaving the defendant subject to sentence under Section 16-52 of the Code, as though the jury had recommended mercy. We followed that procedure in State v. Gibson, 192 S.E.2d 720. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction of the defendant is affirmed, but the sentence imposed by the trial judge is reversed and vacated insofar as it imposed the death penalty. The case is remanded to the Court of General Sessions for Chester County for the purpose of sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment under Section 16-52 of the Code, as if the jury had returned a verdict of guilty with a recommendation to mercy. Affirmed in part; reversed in part. MOSS, C.J., and LEWIS, BUSSEY and BRAILSFORD, JJ., concur."
